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I have chosen for the Sulzbacher Lecture in the bicentennial year to speak on some aspects of the separation
of powers.

It is a topic that has been of major importance

since the birth of our republic.

Its significance as a special

feature of our system of government continues to be recognized.
In an essay written not long ago and recently reprinted, Scott
Buchanan, searching for the essential spirit of our primary
document, wrote, "All constitutions break down the whole governmental institution into parts with specific limited powers,
but the Constitution of. the United States is well known for its
unusually drastic separation of powers."
As we all know, in recent years there has been great
controversy about the respective powers, limitations and responsibilities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
During that period the Presidency was described by some writers
as having become imperial.

It appeared we might be developing

an imperial judiciary as well.
is not unknown.

The idea of an imperial Congress

The many-sided debate has been heated.

This

has emphasized the element of institutional conflict in the
American constitutional system.
It is a recurring debate in America.
the legacy of war and national scandal.

It has often been

In recent years it has

taken concrete form in controversies about the power of the
~

executive to withhold the expenditure of funds appr9priated by
the legislature; the power of' the legislature to limit the execu·
tive's authority to use military force to protect the nation
against foreign threats; .the power of the executive to withhold
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information from the legislature and the judiciary and the
power of the judiciary to set limits on that privilege; the
power of the legislature to publish documents taken from the
executive.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of power was
invoked on all sides of these issues.

Some have thought that

the system has gone 0ut of balance, that the imbalance can best
be overcome by a reassertion of power by the Congress, which as
the most democratic branch of government, (or the branch mettioned
first in the Constitution) should have prtmacy.

Congressional

supremacy is said· to be at the heart of the American tradition
which, after all, began in rebellion against prerogative and
government without representation.

We have had recent experience

with the abuse of executive power.

We have also seen the rise

of modern totalitarian states and been reminded of the danger
of the concentration of power in a single individual.
has been mixed.

But history

Often, and for considerable periods of time,

the concern in the United States has been with the weakness of
the executive, not its strength.
only because memory is very short.

If we have forgotten this, it is
There have been historical

moments, some not so long ago, in which the great concern was
about abuse of power by legislatures and their committees.
Some have warned that Congressional resurgence threatens to be
too great in reaction to the perceived lessons of recent history.
I t' may be useful to approach an understanding of the
doctrine of separation of powers by looking to the origin cf
that idea in the interaction of intellectual theory and practical
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problems during the American revolutionary era.
to history will not resolve all the
of separation of
resolved.

pow~rs.

~mbiguities

This reference
of the doctrine

Perhaps the ambiguities ought not'be

Nor will a knowledge of the original understanding

solve all our contemporary controversies.

It may be that the

expansion of governmental activity into wide areas of the nation's
life and the corresponding growth of the federal bureacracy
have caused an irreversible 'change in our constitutional sys,tem
that requires new modes of understanding.

One example of the

change is the movement for congressional review of administrative
action which is the product of expansive grants of authority
by Congress to the executive at a time when judicially defined
limitations on delegation have fallen.
The proposal for congressional review of administrative
action results in a new and ironic reversal of

roles-~the

executive

making laws and the legislature wielding, in effect, the veto, and
often a one-house veto at that.

We should also keep in mind that

the disease of bureacracy is as catching for the legislature as
for any other branch.
History does not suggest complete answers to the questions
we now ask ourselves.

But in times of uncertainty when there

are urgent calls for change, history may provide an understanding
of the values thought to be served and the practical and salutary
~

consequences thought to result from the separation of powers
principle.

It can help us calculate the consequences of pro-

posed realignment of government power and what may be lost

~
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in the process.
The political theory developing in America through the
. period in which the Constitution was written was influenced by
mariy sources.

Writers of the era drew heavily upon classical

accounts of the growth and decline of governments;

Gibbon'~

first volume of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was
published, after all, in 1776.
of new ideas.

They also felt the fresh breath

They read Voltaire and Rousseau.

Adam Smith's

Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, emphasizing the economic vitality of separating functions,

The predominant

experience of the American makers of government, however, was with
the development of the British Constitution and the relationship
of the British crown and parliament.
The political theory of the revolution was founded on a
conception of the English experience advanced primarily by the
Radical Whigs.

The central metaphor was that a compact existed

between the rulers and the ruled by which the governors were
authorized to act only so long as they· did so in the interest of
the nation as a whole.
right of the people

Liberty was conceived in terms of the

collectiv~ly

to act as a check and counter-

poise to the a:tions of their rulers.

The English Revolution of

1688 was seen as the result of the King's violation of the compac:.
After 1688 the House of Commons, as the institutional expression
of one part of the nation, could limit the prerogative of the
House of Lords, and more importantly, the King.
Yet befor.e the American Revolution, the functioning of
the

Britis~

system, if not its elemental form, was being ques-

t
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tioned.

•

There was a fear that the colonies under British

ru1e--and, indeed, Britain itse1f--were suffering moral decay
of the sort that beset the republics of antiquity before their
fall.

There was also a characteristically ambivalent Calvinist

notion that the colonists were chosen for unique greatness but
that they had to struggle to attain it.

The King and his officers

were thought to have abused their power.

Parliament offered the

colonies no protection.
its

b~ll

In the Declaration of Independence and

of particulars against George III the colonists repeated

the theory of 1688.

The compact had" again been broken.

Yet despite the complaints against the King and the
scourge of the idea of hereditary monarchy in the writings of
men such as Tom Paine, the ideology of the American Revolution
was surprisingly moderate.

As Gordon Wood has written, the colonists

"revolted not against the English constitution but on behalf of
it."
This helps explain the influence in 1776 of Montesquieu,
whose description of the British

arra~gement

stitutions, though it may be of questionable
primary intention was correct.
of separation of powers.

of government inaccurac~

in its

Montesquieu emphasized the idea

"When the legislativ,e and executive

powers are united in the same person," Montesquieu wrote in
Spirit of the Laws, "there can be no liberty."
"E1l
..
f'!q
<.

The doctrine

of separation of powers took as its basis a particular view of
men and power.

It assumed that power corrupts.

as Justice Frankfurter later wrote, "had no

Its proponents,

illusion that our
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people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological
immunities from the hazards of concentrated power."

The

doctrine was based upon the skeptical idea that only the division
of power among three government institutions--executive, legislative, and judicial--could counteract the inevitable tendency
of concentrated authority to overreach and threaten liberty,
But in 1776 the complaint was with the Crown.

In the

colonies the King, the executive power, had acted unchecked,
often with the Parliament's -- but not the colonists' -- consent.
Though the doctrine of separation of powers played a great role
in the debate in 1776, it was seen as a means of controlling
executive power, and its skeptical understanding of man and
government and power did not wholly square with the buoyant
optimism of the times, just as not so long ago the separation
of powers seemed a frustrating barrier to the possible accomplishments which might follow from an assumed unlimited

abundanc~

of resources and to that creativity which could solve every
probl£m.

After 1776, as the new American states began to replace

their colonial charters with new constitutions, strong language
favoring separation of powers was a regular feature.

As Gordon

Wood has WTitten, however, there was "a great discrepancy between
the affirmations of the need to separate the several governmental
departments.and the actual political practice the st.ate govern"ments followed.

It seems, as historians have noted, that Americans

in 1776 gave only a verbal recognition to the concept of separation of powers in their Revolutionary constitutions, since
they were apparently not concerned with a real division of
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departmental functions."

In 1776 separation of powers was a

slogan; it meant that power was to be separated from the
executive and given to legislatures.
After the Revolution was won the optimism faded.

The

experience of the new American states with life under the
Articles of Confederation and under the legislatures set up
and made all-powerful in 1776 convinced George Washington that
"We have, probably, had too good an opinion of human nature in
forming our confederation."
The legislatures had assumed great power, and their rule-for a variety of reasons--was unstable.

The supremacy of legis-

latures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and
the tyranny of shifting majorities.

The legislatures confis-

cated property, erected paper money schemes, suspended the
ordinary means of collecting debts.
great frequency.

They changed the law with

One New Englander complained:

liThe revised

laws have been altered--realtered--made better--made worse; and
kept in such a fluctuating position, that persons in civil
commission scarce know what is law."
Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, wrote
this stinging attack upon the interregnum period legislatures:
..
".'~
'
,

',.

All the powers of government, legislative, executive
and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The
concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely
the definition of despotic government. It will be
no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised
by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one.
One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely
be as oppressive as one . . . And little will it avail
us that they are chosen by ourselves. An elective
despotism was not the government we fought for . . . "
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The work of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was in this
respect a reaction to the unchecked power of the legislatures.
In the later rewriting of history, the abuses to be corrected
were sometimes seen solely in the context of federalism.
much more was involved.

But

The doctrine of separation of powers,

which had become a slogan for legislative supremacy in 1776, in
1787 was reinvigorated as a criticism of legislative power and
was central to the theory of the new government.

As Gordon Wood

has written, "Tyranny was now seen as the abuse of power by any
branch of government, even, and for some especially, by the traditional representatives of the people."

Madison wrote:

"The

accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny."

The liberty that was now emphasized was, as Wood has

described, "the protection of individual rights against all governmental encroachments, particularly by the legislature, the body
which the Whigs had traditionally cherished as the people's exclusive
repository of their public liberty ... ". The structure of government
had to be such that no single institution could exert all power.
Against the "enterprising ambition" of legislative power, wrote
Madison in Federalist 48, uwhich is inspired, by a supposed
influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength," the people should "indulge all their jealousy' and
exhaust all their precautions."

Hamilton in Federalist 71 warned:
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,

The representatives of the people in a popular
assembly seem sometimes to fancy that they
are the people themselves, and betray strong
symptoms of impatience and disgust at the
least sign of opposition from any other quarter;
as if the exercise of its rights, by either
the executive or the judiciary were a breach
of their privilege and an outrage to their
dignity. They often appear disposed to exert
an imperious control over the other departments;
and as they commonly have the people on their
side, they always act with such momentum as
to make it very difficult for the other members
of the government to maintain the balance of
the Constitution.
Hamilton's

words and the Federalist Papers as a whole

express two related

asp~cts

of the new American conception

of politics that emerged from the experiences of the interregnum
period.

First, that the people and not the institutions of

government are sovereign.
with "We, the people."

The Constitution after all begins

Second, that no institution of government

is, or should be taken to be, the embodiment of society expressing

the general will of the people.

In. the process of this

fundamental shift away from the Whig theory and its conception
of the British Constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers
took on a new meaning.

Each branch of government served the

sovereign people. No branch could correctly claim to be the
sole representative of the people.

Representation was to be

of different kinds according to the functions to be performed.
Each branch derived its powers from the people, and its powers

~

were subject to the limitations imposed by the constitutional
grant of authority.

Government power was divided among the

branches, and a system of interdependence was erected by which

- 10 each branch had certain limited powers to control the excesses
of other branches.

In this way it was hoped that the public

interest could be achieved and, at the same time, liberty protected from ty.ranny.

As Buchanan has written, "'We the People'

are the authority that propagates the Constitution. a master
l'aw which in turn establishes other authorities or offices which
in turn propagate other laws ... [T)he Constitution distinguishes
three great offices, powers or functions:

the legislative, the

executive, and the judiciary; and to them are assigned respectively three uses of practical reason:

the making of laws, the

executing or administration of laws. and the adjudication of
laws.

Furthermore, the Constitution not only divides these

functions but also separates them by making the institutions
equal and independent."
on a similar conception.

The doctrine of federalism was based
The national government was made

supreme, hut only in a limited compass defined by limited powers.
Thus the sovereign people and the states retained all powers
not delegated to the national government.
The compact between the rulers and the ruled had changed
in its fundamental terms.

Rather than a general agreement to

be governed for such time as the rulers acted in the interest
of society as a whole, the new compact was seen to be something
closer to a limited agency arrangement in which each branch of
government was authorized to act in unique ways in limited areas.
One must be cautious, as Alexander Bickel has taught, about using
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such contractual metaphors lest they make the institutions
seem too sharply defined in their powers,
~

The provisions

in the Constitution were, rather, the expression of compromises
that mirror the sort of adaptation and accommodation envisioned
by the process the Constitution set into motion.

But there is

no doubt that the separation of powers was consciously intended
as a confrontation with problems to be solved, and in its new
form an invention for the future.
The Congress was delegated enumerated .legislative powers
and such other power as l'l7aS "necessary and proper" to the effectuation of the

enumerat~d

powers.

The executive was.to be made

more energetic than it had been in the interregnum state constitutions.

Whether executive power was meant to be limited by

enumeration quickly became" a matter of controversy between Hamilton
and Madison once the Constitution was ratified.

Some years ago

Professor Crosskey argued that the enumerated powers of the Congress
were not so much a limitation on legislative power as a way of
clearly stating the power of Congress so that the executive could
not so easily encroach upon it.
opposition to states' rights.
tion

But Crosskey's concern was an
And his argument was that the enumera-

did not limit national power.

There was no question, however,

that the Constitution meant to expand the power of the executive.
"Energy
~

in the Executive," wrote Hamilton in Federalist 70, '.Its

a leading character in the definition of good government.

It is

essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration

- 12 of the laws; to the protection of property against those
irregular and highhanded combinations which sometimes interrupt
the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and
of anarchy."

Jay in Federalist 64 wrote that the President must

be unitary and protected in the conduct of foreign affairs in part
because those who \vould supply useful intelligence "would rely on the
secrecy of the President" but would not confide "in that of the
Senate and still less in that of a large popular Assembly."
At the same time the judiciary, which had been subject
to significant encroachments by the revolutionary period legislatures, began to be seen as another important bulwark against
tyranny_

Though distrusted before the revolution as an arbitrary

mechanism of the Crown, the courts rose dramatically in importance after the experiences of the interregnum period.

But the

power courts were to assume was not that "energetic" power Hamilton
asserted for the executive.

It was a more passive

power, not only to

articulate and apply the principles of law with justice in individual
cases but also to repel attacks, by the legislature or executive, on
basic rights.

It was a vital. but limited power.

The view of

the courts contained, 1 .believe, a good deal of the continuing
English view, articulated in our time by Lord Devlin, that "it
would not be good for judges to act executively; it is better
to expect executives to act judicially."

James Wilson who in the

Constitutional Convention debates· favored judicial power to nullify
unconstitutional statutes also warned against conferring "upon the
judicial department a power superior, in its general nature
to that of the legislature."
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The constitutional system contemplated the possibility
~

of disagreement among the branches, but it d~fined the channels
through which those conflicts were to be resolved.

Indeed,

Madison was obliged to defend the draft constitucion against
the argument that the three branches had not been made separate
enough.

Appealing to Montesquieu, Madison wrote, "His meaning

can amount to no more than this, that 'to/herE the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted."

Acting within

its sphere, within the constitutional limits of its power
and within the bounds placed by the institutional responsibilities
of the other branches, each branch was to be supreme, subject
only--ultimately, indirectly and in various ways--to the decisions
of the people.

Each branch had a degree of independence so

that its activities would not be entirely taken over by another,
but they were tied together with a degree of interdependence
as well so that, in Madison's words, "ambition (could) be made
to counteract ambition."
The system also contemplated responsibility and
accommodation, for though the branches were separate, they
were part of one government.

As Justice Jackson wrote, "While

the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
~

it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.

It enjoins upon its

branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.

If
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The exhilaration of the Revolution and the despair
of the misgovernment that followed it, the optimistic
political philosophies of Locke and Rousseau and the pessimistic views of Montesquieu and Hobbes, these came together
in the creation of the American republic.

Michael Kammen

has written: "What would eventually emerge from these ter:sions
between liberty and authority, between society and its instruments of government?

For one thing, a political style, a

way of doing lnd viewing public affairs in which several
sorts of biformities would be prevalent:

pragmatic idealism,

conservative liberalism, orderly violence, and moderate
rebellion."

I would add to that list of paradoxes one more--

skeptical optimism. It was this vision of man and government
that formed the basis for the separation of powers doctrine.
At various times in the 19th Century and after,
the idea of the potential excellence of human nature and
the trustworthiness of unchecked popular will reasserted
itself.

As Martin Diamond wrote recently in Public

~~~

IIIn the 19th Century, there were many who mocked Montesquieu
for his fear of political power and for his cautious institutional strategies . . . But let those now mock who read the
20th Century as warranting credence in such a conception of
human nature, as entitling men to adventures in unrestrained
power."
The 19th Century was a time of great Romantic
idealism.

The industrial revolution deified Energy, and

the Romantic writers expressed their adulation because to

- 15 them men and nature shared in the
grace of life.
,

abun~ant

energy and

The 20th Century has slowly brought changes

in this view, though in some respects it lingers.

In litera-

ture the glorification of human energy and spirit is tempered
by metaphors of entropy and humbling intellectual paradoxes.
If the emphasis is still upon the self, that self shares
the potential cruelty of nature, its ineluctable process
of running down, and its fundamental impenetrability to observation.

The skeptical vision embodied in the separation of

powers doctrine again has its intellectual resonance.
But in the 19th Century, particularly following
the Civil War, there was a reemergence of the Whig theory
that the legislature is the best expression of the people's
will.

Congress gained ascendency.

During that period Woodrow

Wilson finished his essay, Congressional Government.

It is

an important work to study today since it challenges the
American system of separation of powers.

To Wilson the

British parliamentary form of government seemed superior.
He favored that system because to Wilson legislative ascendency
and executive decline under our form of government seemed
inevitable.

The parliamentary system made the"legislature

responsible and effective and in that context provided for
executive leadership.

"The noble charter of fundamental law

given us by the convention of 1787," he wrote, "is still our
Constitution, but it is now our form of government rather
in name than in reality, the form of government being one of
nicely adjusted, dual balances, while the actual form of our

- 16 present government is simply a scheme of congressional supremacy
... All niceties of constitutional restr ic. tion, and even many
broad principles of constitutional limitation have been overridden and a thoroughly organized system of congressional
control set up which giveS a very rude negative to some
theories of balance and some schemes for distributed
"

pow~rs

To Wilson in the l880s, the presidency had been incurably

weakened.

"That high office has fallen from its just estate

of dignity,"

he wrote, "because its power has waned; and its

power has waned because the power of Congress has become predominant. 11

Though some years later he saw a greater hope

in the re8ssertion of an energetic executive, in the l880s the only
remedy for the failings of congressional supremacy seemed a
fundamental change in the system.

Referring to Wilson's

warnings about congressional power in the American system,
Walter Lippman in an edition of the book published in the
1950s

wrote, "(T)he morbid symptoms which he identified are

still clearly recognizable when the disease recurs and there
is a relapse into Congressional supremacy.

This was a good

book to have read at the end of the Truman and at the beginning
of the Eisenhower Administrations."

It is also excellent

reading today, not the least because of Wilson's observations
that "if there be one principle clearer than another, it is
this:

that in any business, whether of government or of mere

merchandising, somebody must be trusted, in order that when
things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished
. . . Power and strict accountability for its use are the
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essential constituents of good government."
President Taft in a 1912 message to Congress recommended that members of the cabinet be given seats in each
House of Congress.

"There has been much lost in the machinery·."

Taft wrote, "due to the lack of cooperation and interchange
of views face to face between the representatives of the
executive and the members of the two legislative branches of
the government.

It was never intended that they should be

separated in the sense of not being in effective touch and
relationship to each other.1f
accepted.

This idea was, of course, never

Had it been, the process of interchange between

executive and legislature would have been much different than
the model of congressional inquiry by testimony to committees
as it works today.

Taft envisioned a new system just as Wilson

did in his appeal to the parliamentary system.
The Wilson text which arose out of a concern for the
weakness of executive power is often turned to these days because of a yearning for the perceived legislative power of the
British system.

Wilson in 1885 wrote that legislative inquiry

into the administration of government is even more important
than lawmaking.

The answer to executive weakness was to be a

form of parliamentary executive government.

Wilson's model

of the process of legislative inquiry was the question period
in Parliament.

"No cross-examination is more searching than

that to which a minister of the Crown is subjected by· the allcurious Commons," Wilson wrote.

This gives a clue to what sort

of questioning he thought appropriate.

The question period in
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Parliament is not what it is often thought to be.
strictly disciplined affair.

It is a

Precedent' has been established

as to the inadmissibility of a wide variety of questions
including those seeking an expression of opinion, or information
about an issue pending in court, or proceedings of the Cabinet
or Cabinet committee, or information about past history for
purpose of argument.

In addition the Speaker has always held

that a Minister has no obligation to answer a question--though
if he fails to answer he must suffer the political consequences.
A Minister may always decline to answer either because the
matter under inquiry is not within his responsibility or, more
importantly, because to give the information requested would
be contrary to the public interest.

The reason for such wide

discretion for the Ministers seems clear to British writers,
though it might shock those who would substitute parliamentary
forms for our own because of distrust of the wisdom of separation of powers.

"Had the Speaker ruled otherwise," wrote two

approving contemporary students of the question period, "he
would have had to devise some form of disciplinary action suitable for extracting an answer out of a stubborn Minister."
While it is true that the Ministers in Britain are
directly accountable to the legislators--an'd this might make
it seem a commodious sytem to those who prefer legislative
supremacy--the British system also allows the Prime Minister
to choose whatever moment he may for a national election of
legislators.

The relationship between executive and legislative

is neither more relaxed nor more one-sided in Britain than it is
in our system.

The Cabinet is directly accountable to Parliament,

- 19 but Parliament sits only at the indulgence of the Cabine,t.
That is not our system, and I doubt whether anyone
seriously thinks of altering our Constitution so drastically
as to make it our system.

But one cannot have that kind of

parliamentary system without such drastic changes.

The

features of parliamentary government that may seem most appealing to the proponents of legislative supremacy upon closer
examination turn out to be imaginary--and this may be its
strength--because the British system, as it was in Montesquieu's
description, is

also in fact a system of separated powers.

Nevertheless, the thought in quite recent time has
been that the congressional government Wilson wrote about
gave way to an equally problematical presidential government.
One of the reasons given for this change was that the complexity
and immediacy of the problems of the modern world required a
strong President, though Jefferson saw the same need at the
time of the Louisiana Purchase.

He called that transaction,

"an act beyond the Constitution" but said it had been done
"in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so advances the
good of (the) country . . . It

It was a necessary act, as he

saw it, not only beyond executive but also beyond legislative
authority.

Whether the reasons for Presidential power be

new or old, there has been a feeling that both the executive
and the judiciary have assumed functions that properly belong
to the legislature.
The encroachment of one branch of our federal government upon the functions of another 'is not a new phenomenon.
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The tendency of a governmental department to augment its
own powers may be thought to be an inherent tendency of
government generally, although its consequences are all the
more serious in a system whose very genius is a tripartite
separation of governing powers.

The instances of such in-

fringement throughout our history are reflected in the case
law.

In re Debs, in which the Supreme Court upheld an in-

junction issued without express statutory authority, might be
viewed as a case in which both the Court and tLe Executive
usurped the legislative function of Congress.

The Steel

Seizure Case, in which President Truman without statutory
authority commandeered the nation's steel mills, is perhaps
the most famous example of the Executive arrogating to itself
the law-making power of Congress.

Ex Parte Milligan represented

the Executive's attempt during the Civil War to exercise the
judicial power to try criminal cases.

The Supreme Court, too,

has not been entirely immune to the temptation to stray into
the province of the other branches.
The necessity of protecting each branch against encroachment by the others has not gone unanswered.

The Speech

and Debate Clause of the Constitution has been given a broad
cOlstruction to insulate the Congress against unwarranted interference in the performance of its duties.

The Gravel case

held that the Clause confers absolute immunity on Congressmen
and their aides for acts performed in furtherance of their
legislative functions.

The protected act in that case involved

Senator Gravel's decision to read classified documents, known
popularly as the Pentagon Papers, into the public record at
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a meeting of a Congressional subcommittee.

The Eastland

case, decided last Term, held that the Speech and Debate
Clause prevented the issuance of an injunction against a
Congressional committee, its members and staff, so long as
the committee is acting broadly within its "legitimate
legislative sphere."

The committee in that case had issued a

subpoena against a bank to obtain the records of a dissident
organization as part of its study of the administration and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

The Eastland

case states a reaffirmation of the separation of powers.
Indeed, it says, quoting from

United States v. Johnson, that

the Speech and Debate Clause "serves the ... function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established
by the Founders."
But the problems are not simple.

Congress has on

occasion intruded upon the functions of the other branches.
United States v. Klein involved an attempt by Congress to limit
the effect of the President's pardon power by depriving
federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce certain indemnification
claims.

The Supreme Court held that the statute violated separa-

tion of powers since it invaded the judicial province by
"prescrib[ing] rules of decision" in pending cases and infringed
upon the power of the Executive by "impairing the effect of
a pardon."
Congressional investigations have also tended to
assume a purpose divorced from legitimate legislative functions.

- 22 In 1881 in Kilbourn v. Thompson the Court severely curbed
Congress' contempt power and warned that Congress had "no
general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the
citizen."

The period after World War II, as perhaps is the

case after most wars, saw an exercise of the legislature's
investigatory power far broader than in any previous period,
and, eventually, a recognition that that power could be abused
to impose sanctions on individual conduct and beliefs, without
the vital protections to personal liberty and privacy that
law and the judicial process affords, and with an accompanying
disruption of governmental functions.

In some instances, the

Court identified the abuse, and pronounced appropriate limits
on the power.

In Watkins v. United States, it reversed a con-

viction resulting from a witness' refusal to answer certain
questions before a House committee.

The Court reasoned that

the conviction was improper since the ambiguous purpose of the
committee's inquiry precluded any determination whether the
questions were pertinent to the
tasks.

committee's proper legislative

The Court cautioned that although the power to conduct

investigations is inherent in the legislative power, "there is
no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of
Congress . . . . Nor is Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency.

These are functions of the executive and judicial

departments."
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On occasion, Congress has also used its legislative
power directly to invade the powers of other branches.

In the

Lovett case the Court held that a statute forbidding payment of
compensation to three named government employees was unconstitutional, since it imposed punishment without a judicial trial
and thus constituted a uBill of Attainder."

United States v.

Brown presented a statute making it a crime for a member of
the Communist Party to be an official or employee of a labor
union.

The court held this a bill of attainder.

The consti-

tutional prohibition against such bills of attainder, the
Court observed, was an integral part of the separation of
powers.

The prohibition "reflected the Framers' belief that

the Legislative Branch is not -so well suited as politically
indeperidentjudges and juries to the task of ruling upon the
blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,
specific persons."
The Supreme Court has also attempted to protect the
Executive against improper Congressional intrusion
prerogatives.

on its

It is interesting to note that Morrison in commen-

ting on Washington's first administration writes that "'Heads of
departments had to be appointed by the President, with the
consent of the Senate, but Congress, in orgnnizing executive
departments, might have made their heads responsible to and

~,

removable by itself.

Instead it made the secretaries of state

and war responsible to the President

alone~and

direction within their legal competence."

subject to his

Myers v. United States
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upheld the power of the President to remove executive
officers appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate.

In

de~laring

unconstitutional a statute seeking

to make removal dependent upon the consent of the Senate,
the Court stated that the executive power vested in the
President under Article II must include the unlimited discretion to remove subordinates whose performance the President
regards, for whatever reason, as unsatisfactory.

The statute

. attempting to limit that discretion, the Court noted,
violated the principle· of separation of powers and would have
given Congress unwarranted

authority "to vary fundamentally

the operation of the great independent branch of government
and thus most seriously toweakenit.1t

The Court also rejected

as a "fundamental misconception" the idea that Congress is
the only defender of the people in the government.

"The

President," the Court observed, "is a representative of the
people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are,
and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the
President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the
. 1ature.
L egl.S

. ."

These cases occurred because on occasion each
branch has abused the power entrusted to it and in some
instances invaded the powers that properly belong to the
others.

In some instances the Court has been able and willing

to provide remedies.

In other instances, as in Debs, the
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Court has failed to perceive the problem or has participated
in creating it.
In~eriods

of reaction to past events--and we are

in such a period--it is more than ever necessary to take
time to contemplate the fundamental guidance which a living
constitution is intended to provide.

The essence of the

separation of powers concept formulated by the Founders from
the political experience and thought of the revolutionary
era is that each branch, in different ways, within the sphere
of its defined powers and subject to the

distinct institu-

tional responsibilities of the others, is essential to the
liberty and security of the people.

Each branch, in its own

way, is the people's agent, its fiduciary for certain purposes.

Two points, I think, follow from this conception

and, in the course of our history, have been perceived as
following from it.
has been rightly

First, the question of whether power
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exercised, or Exercised within the limits the Constitution
defines, is not always a problem of separation of powers.
Some powers have been confided to no

branch~

Abuse of

power may mean that the limits should be enforced on all
branches of

governmen~

not that the power is better conferred

on and exercised by a branch other than that which has
abused it.

A corollary of this is that a weakness in one

branch of the government is not always best corrected by
a weakening of another branch.
Second, perhaps what is most remarkable about the
various cases that to some extent define the allocation of
power among the branches is that their number is relatively
few.

That fact is a testament to the respect that each branch

generally has maintained for, the powers and responsibilities of
the others, and to an understanding
that each branch, within its sphere,
represents and serves the people's interest.

As Scott Buchanan

has written, in our constitutional system, each branch
ultimately relies for its authority on its power to persuade the
people.

In this sense, each branch is democratic, as each

is specially representative, whatever its manner of selection.
Fiduciaries do not meet their obligations by arrogating to
themselves the distinct duties of their master's other agents.
Inevitably in a system of divided powers there are points
where responsibility conflicts, where legitimate interests and
demands appear on either side.

In such instances, accommodation
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and compromise reflecting the exigencies of the matter at
hand bavebeen not only possible but a felt necessity.

The

essence of compromise is that there is no surrender of
principle or power on either side, but there is a respect
for the responsibility of others and recognition of the
need for flexibility and reconciliation of competing interests.
This general respect and the felt need
for accommodation has been a part of the role of the courts.
Recognizing the limits of their own proper functions and
institutional competence, the courts had long employed a series
of

devic~s

that had, as their ultimate purpose, avoiding

interference with the powers and functions of the other branches.
These restrictions, founded in the case or controversy
requirement of Article III or frankly in prudential considerations
that must govern the exercise of judicial power, defined
and'narrowed the occasions in which judicial resolution may
be sought.

But they recognized, too, that certain questions

may be better left without resolution in law, and allowed to
work themselves out in the political process and in the ad hoc
process of accommodation.
To some extent, and perhaps to a more substantial
extent than had been thought, these barriers to judicial
resolution remain.

In United States v. Richardson, the

Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer, lacked
standing to obtain an injunction requiring, under the
Constitution's Statement and Account Clause, a published
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accounting of Central Intelligence Agency expenditures.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, wrote that:
"Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related
to the expansion of judicial power .... (A)llowing unrestricted
taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the
allocation of power at the national level ....

II

There is a discomfort in uncertainty.
on the part of some, a.longing for

s~pleJ

There is,

straight answers

about the allocation of powers among the branches and the
responsibilities of each to the other.

There is a

corresponding tendency to assume that the courts can provide
the answers by deduction from, constitutional principles, and
properly act as umpire between the other branches.

In some

instances, as in the Steel Seizure case, this may be the
inevitable consequence of the courts' performance of their
duties properly where private interests are immediately
affected.

But there are other instances in which the dispute

may be purely one between the institutional interests of the
Congress and the Executive.

The intervention of the Courts

in such matters may be furthered if courts recognize standing
in members of Congress to challenge the legality of Executive
actions.

Some courts have done so, apparently on the ground

that the Executive's action

d~inishes

and thus the power of each member.

congressional power
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Resolution of such disputes provides a kind of
certainty.
caution.

But this is an area of great. difficulty, requiring
There is no doubt that judicial intervention is

sometimes essential.

The danger is that in attempting to

provide final answers not only will the courts inevitably
alter the balance between Congress and the Executive in the
context of a particular situation, but the very nature of
this kind of determination, when the interactions of a government
of checks and balances are involved, may then require
continuing judicial supervision.

This would constitute a

removal to the courts of judgments of responsibility and
discretion, contrary to the

f~ndamental

conception of different

functions to be differently performed by the divisions of
government.

It would significantly alter the balance between

the courts and the other branches.

The consequence may well

be a weakening rather than a strengthening of accountability.
We are sometimes said to be a litigious

people, but the

Constitution, while it establishes a rule of law, was not
intended to create a government by litigation.

A government

by representation through different brariches, and with interaction
and discussion, would be much nearer the mark.
The current controversies concerning the demands of
~

one branch of the government for information in the hands of
another reflect some of the complexities.

Congress has in some

instances through its own legislation placed statutory
restrictions on the disclosure of information in the Executive's
possession.

Some of these statutes, no doubt, would never

I,
~

~
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have been enacted without such restrictions.

i

when the executive

acts under such statutes, his action has nothing to do with
Executive Privilege.
tion of a statute.

It has to do with the good faith interpretaSome of these statutes by their own terms repre-

sent a government's pledge of confidentiality to its citizens.
Congress which passed the statute took part in making that pledge.
The construction of these statutes, if the appropriate forum can
be found, can be regarded as a standard judicial task, identical
to the kinds of decisions which courts make frequently.

The issue

raises separation of powers problems only to the extent that it
concerns the ability of' the legislature, having enacted a statute,
to later place its own interpretation by committee action, without
later enactment, on the meaning to be given to the words used.
There have, of course, been many disputes between Congress and the
'Courts on stmilar issues.

To be sure some interpretations of such

statutes lately advanced do concern most directly the power of the
Congress to the point of asserting that Congress may not constitutionally grant a confidentiality against itself. Such a principle
bears no resemblance to the system the Constitution established.
The primary argument has been that such statutes, unless they
mention Congress specifically, do not mean what they appear to say.
In the long run a dispute of this latter nature might best be
solved by Congress establishing a commission to review such statutes,
of which there are many, involving citizens' claims to privacy,
and then through revision and reenactment making explicit the
limitation on the apparent confidentiality conferred.

•
~
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In other quite different instances, the demand of a
legislative committee for documents or testimony

can raise

the issue of Executive Privilege as part of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Even in such instanc.es, however, it is

important to stress that the requirement for some confidentiality
is not unique to

an~r

one branch of the government.

It is a

need that Congress and the Judiciary as well as the Executive
have asserted" and attempted to meet.

It is a need which all

advanced countries have recognized, whether or not they have
a doctrine of separation of powers.
solely a governmental necessity.

Nor is it, of course,

As the Supreme Court

acknowledged in NAACP v. Alabama, the invasion of privacy
by investigation and publication can pose grave harm, and.
indeed, can at times be employed to deter the exercise of
fundamental rights.
One primary area of responsibility has been the
confidentiality of the decision-making process.

The Constitution

provides a ·structure where some decisions are normally made in
public; the founders were quite explicit that others should not
be.

There is a theory in science that one can never know

with certainty what one is observing since the process necessary
for observation can change what is observed.

Scientists among

you will know, far better than I, whether the analogy is apt.
But the principle is suggestive.
said:

As the Supreme Court recently

"Human experience teaches that those who expect public

dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
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The need for

confidentiality to protect the safety of citizens and
individual rights goes beyond the decision-making process
to the protection of some information essential to the
security of the nation and the conduct of foreign affairs.
Of course there are competing considerations.

An informed

public is essential in a democratic republic, and Congress
requires information for informed legislation.

The courts, on

occasion, must have access to information in the possession
of the Executive if it is essential to informed adjudication.
There is a conflict of values, a necessary ordering of means
and ends, with the public good as the common objective.

Concern

for the functioning of each branch must be accompanied by
recognition of, and accommodation to, the responsibilities of
others.

Historically, in this area as in others, compromise

has been our course.
This has been so of demands for information in the
hands of the Executive in the context of judicial proceedings.
From the Burr case early in our history to very recent years,
means have been found for leaving the decision on disclosure
to the Executive in ways found and enforced by the Courts
to be consistent with fairness to litigants.

The only

exception to that rule was established by the Supreme Court
in 1973 in United States v. Nixon.

The case was singular

in the circumstances that foreclosed the normal means of
accommodation to protect both the public and private interests
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involved.

But although requiring disclosure in the unique

circumstances of the case, the Court expressly recognized

'"
j

that the Executive's right of confidentiality is a necessary
adjunct to the Executive's constitutional power.

While this

right obviously should be used with care and discretion, and
with an understanding of the comity which must exist among
the branches of government, it is perhaps well to remind those
who in the past have been concerned about an imperial presidency
that a too limited version of the scope of the right can drive
deliberations into a more centralized and dependent focus--a
result directly contrary to what they would wish.
But in

re~ent

years there have been calls for final

resolution, perhaps generated by abuses on both sides, for
clear definition by the courts of Congress' right to demand
disclosure and of the Executive power to refuse.

To a limited

degree these calls have been satisfied, although in a way that
can have been satisfactory neither to the advocates of
congressional power nor to the advocates of the Executive.

In

United States v. Nixon, private interests were, as the Court
recognized, immediately affected.

Moreover in a conflict

involving, in one of its dimensions, the integrity of the
judicial process, it was

necessary for the Court to

come to a judgment of relative interests.

But in Senate

Select Committee v. Ni.xon, in which jurisdiction was based on a

·1

statute specially enacted for purposes of the case, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that because
the Senate Committee's need for the information did not,
in the circumstances, outweigh the Exe'cutive' s need for
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confidentiality, the Executive did not have a legal obligation
to comply with the Committee's subpoena.

The values and

needs asserted on bo·th sides were matters not perhaps
sus·c;:eptible to judicial calibration.

The Gou:rt' s state-

ments ahout the Congress' need for inf 0 rma.t ion provides
lit.tle comfort to those who insist on unrestricted congressional
access.
Cases may come in which judicial resolution is necessary.
They are most likely to come if the Congress, as some of its committees have. recently threatened to. do, asserts its a'a,thority by
•

attemptifl·<;T .to.· hold in contempt executive ·officers···who "act under
a presidential assertion of privilege or who are conforming
to the mandate of a statute, which has nothing to do with
executive privilege,and when the Attorney General, as he is
required to do by statute, has given his opinion.

Under present

circumstances if Congress were to take such a course, it would
either ask for the official's indictment--a road with incredible
problems, outside the spirit of the Constitution, and carrying
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one month--or take
the more traditional course, little used in this century and
never against an incumbent cabinet officer, of attempting itself
to impose coercive or punitive restraints, in which case, I
suppose, an application for habeas corpus would be the appropriate
remedy.

Either course would be, at the least, unedifying, al-

though the more so when punishment rather than clarification is
sought--an attempt by one branch to assert its authority by
imposing personal sanctions on those who seek to perform their
duty as officials of another branch equal to the Congress in
responsibility
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to serve the people.

This is not the statesmanship which

created our republic, nor is it justified by past abuses.
Such an argument would have made our present Constitution
an impossibility.

It does not rectify abuses; it supplants

them with new ones.
Such resolution has been little used in the past,
not only because considerations of respect and comity have
overcome the pressures of the moment, but because, I think,
there has been an implicit, perhaps intuitive appreciation
that judicial resolution, whatever it ultimately might be,
and which at times is necessary, would have severe costs.
The separation o,f powers doctrine as Scott
Buchanan wisely emphasized is a political doctrine.

It is

based, he wrote, on the idea that government institutions given
separate functions, organizations and powers will operate with
different modes of reasoning.

Each mode is important to the

processes of law formation and to the generation of popular
consent to the law.
The doctrine of separation of powers was also
designed to control the power of government by tension among
the branches, with each, at the margin, limiting the other.
But there is a misperception about
~

th~t

tension.

For example,

Arthur Schlesinger once described the doctrine as creating
"permanent guerrilla warfare',' between the executive and
legislative branches.

To be sure, the authors of the Constitution

had a realistic view of man and government and power.

They
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assumed that from time to time men in power might grow too
bold and engage in overreaching that threatens liberty and the
balance of the system.

They designed the system ,in such a way

that the overreaching--the threatened tyranny--might be
checked.

But they did not envision a government in which

'each branch seeks out confrontation; they hoped the,system
of checks and balances would achieve a harmony of purpose
differently fulfilled.
The branches of government were not designed to be
at war with one another.

The relationship was not to be

an adversary, one, though to think of it that way has become
fashionable.

Adversaries make out their claims with a bias,

and one would not want to suggest that the Supreme Court, for
example, ought to view each case before it aS4 a chance to
increase or protect its institutional power.

Justice Stone

and others have written of the importance of the Court's sense
of self-restraint.

That insight applies as well to the

executive and legislature.

If history were to teach, that

might be its lesson rather than new cycles of aggression.
Institutional self-restraint does not mean that we
must have a government of hesitancy.

It does mean that the

duty to act is coupled with a duty to act with care and comity
and with a sense of the higher values we all cherish.

This

is the wisdom of the separation of powers, for as Buchanan
wrote, "Under our constitution the law divides itself so that
reason can rule."

- 37 The Founders of the Republic, as the Federalis"t
Papers state, thought they had found "means, and powerful
means, by which the excellences of republican government
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided."
Among those means was "the regular distribution of power
into distinct departments. 1t

For a country which has come

through a storm, aided so greatly by the wisdom of the basic
document thus fashioned, some reflection and an ability
to take the longer view is now called for.

We owe that much

to the Founders; we owe that much to ourselves.
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